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Chapter 3
The 3 per cent Barcelona Target: A Critical Appraisal 
of the Failure of the Lisbon Strategy’s Knowledge-
based Economy and Society Project
Laszlo Fekete
Abstract: Ten years after the unanimous approval of the Lisbon Strategy at a 
special meeting of the European Council on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon, it will 
be inevitable for the European Council, the European Commission and the major-
ity of the EU member states to face with its fi asco and to account for the reasons 
of their fundamental policy, governance and economic failures in 2010. The recent 
turbulence of the global economy offers some excuses for the underperformance 
of the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy in the essential social and economic 
domains, like job creation, economic growth, and environmental sustainability. 
Negative growth rates, macroeconomic and fi nancial instability, the contraction 
of the internal and external markets of the European economy, drop in demand for 
capital investment, goods and services, sinking corporate revenues, depreciation 
of corporate assets, increasing private and public indebtedness, falling rate of em-
ployment, weakening social cohesion, widening social inequality, and so forth not 
only deprive the majority of the EU member states of fulfi lling the main objectives 
of the Lisbon Strategy but also drive them into worse social and economic condi-
tions in many policy domains than they were in 2000.
Keywords: Lisbon strategy, Innovation, R&D, Knowledge economy and so-
ciety.
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Innovation, Research and Development Policies in the Recent 
Downturn
Nevertheless, the disappointing outcome cannot be exclusively ascribed to the 
recent global crisis because the political commitments of the majority of the EU 
member states to accomplish either the original or the subsequent and more fo-
cused objectives of the Lisbon Strategy were weak and sometimes entirely lack-
ing even in the halcyon years of the present decade. The governments of the EU 
member states neither discussed critically the feasibility of the main objectives of 
the Lisbon Strategy, nor adhered faithfully to them. The objectives of the Lisbon 
Strategy were regularly and ritually agreed upon without expressing objections 
and disapprovals in Lisbon, Stockholm, Gothenburg, Barcelona, Lahti, and Brus-
sels between 2000 and 2008. A few critical reports, like the Sapir Report (2003) 
and the Kok Report (2004), already called attention to the incoherencies of the 
economic and social objectives, the inappropriate institutional settings, the lack of 
political leadership and ownership of the whole project, and the underprovision of 
fi nancial resources for the key areas of the economic and social development but 
their recommendations did not lead to the careful revision of – as the rapporteurs 
noticed – this overloaded agenda (Sapir Report 2003, 27., 79., 84-86.; Kok Report 
2004, 6.). One of the most serious shortcomings in professional soundness, politi-
cal and economic determination, appropriate governance structure and satisfactory 
fi nancial involvement has affected the national and community-wide innovation, 
research and development policies from the outset. The attempts of reorganizing 
the EU budget in order to provide more incentives and fi nancial means to increase 
research and development expenditures on community level were disapproved 
(Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2006, 4.; Pelkmans and Casey 2004). Even though, the 
European Commission confi dently emphasized in the Investing in Research: An 
Action Plan for Europe (2003) that: “All Member States, acceding and candidate 
countries agreed on the importance of increasing investment in research, and most 
indicated that they had already put in place policies and concrete measures to that 
effect, or were in the process of doing so. Many have also set national targets in 
line with the European 3% objective. For example, both France and Germany have 
adopted the 3% objective for themselves, and so has a future Member State, Slove-
nia. Momentum is thus building up” (European Commission 2003, 5.). The strong 
commitment of the EU member states as well as the European business enterprises 
to the 3 per cent Barcelona target has not materialized in the fi gures of science, 
technology and innovation statistics, yet.
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Needless to emphasize, the lack of the solid political commitments and eco-
nomic efforts of accomplishing the common policy aim in the fi elds of innova-
tion, research and development entirely undermines the ultimate goal of the Lis-
bon Strategy, namely, as it was proclaimed in the Presidency Conclusions of the 
Lisbon European Council in 2000, “to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world” (European Council 2000, § 5.). There-
fore, the majority of the EU member states’ attitude toward the objectives of the 
Lisbon Strategy characterized by the political, economic, institutional inertia and 
the art of rhetoric in the fi elds of innovation, research and development has antici-
pated the poor outcome of the whole project from the very beginning. Today, the 
knowledge-based economy and society, as determined in Lisbon, seem to be rather 
nice to have agenda for the majority of the EU member states than a vital precon-
dition for the future economic and social development of their countries and the 
European Union.
As a matter of fact, the Lisbon Strategy could not bring about any notice-
able change in the European innovation landscape, indeed. While, the most in-
novative countries, like Sweden and Finland, have managed to keep and advance 
their distinguished position, and few countries, like Austria, Denmark, Portugal 
and Estonia, have made considerable efforts to improve their overall research and 
development intensity, the mediocre and feeble positions of the majority of the 
EU member states have remained unchanged in the global ranking of innovation 
performance since 2000. In 2008 the gross domestic research and development 
expenditure of the EU-15 was exactly as low as it had been in 2000 that is 1.91 
per cent in terms of GDP. The research and development intensity was reduced in 
France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Poland, Slovakia 
and Bulgaria during the same period. Compared to the OECD average of 2.276 per 
cent of research and development expenditure in terms of GDP, the EU-15 is also 
outperformed by a signifi cant margin in 2008 because of the higher research and 
development intensity of the most dynamic global competitors. In addition, the 
research and development intensity of a few non-OECD economies, like Israel’s, 
Singapore’s, and Taiwan’s, is substantially above the OECD average. In addition, 
the particularly high rate of economic growth was not matched up to comparable 
high increase in research and development intensity in the new EU member states 
which have shown very impressive economic performance in the previous decade. 
Starting from a very low base of innovation performance, the fi gures of public and 
private research and development intensity have shown certain improvement in 
some of the new EU member states, like Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Estonia, 
since their accession, but due to the modest size of their annual GDP and the wide 
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gap of innovation, research and development intensity between the EU-15 and 
the EU-10 it was not enough to make any statistically recognizable impact on the 
stalled trends of the EU-27. 
Recently, the European Commission reasserts the outstanding importance of 
the increase of public and private research and development expenditures and rec-
ommends the countercyclical investment strategy in time of economic crisis in 
its European Economic Recovery Plan issued on 26 November 2008 (European 
Commission 2008.; IMF 2009, 113-123.). Nevertheless, endogenous growth the-
ory fi rmly demonstrates that the optimal path for innovation is countercyclical for 
the countries where the fi rms face tight credit constraints due to the fi nancial crisis. 
However, there is no conclusive view in the economic literature about the genuine 
public and corporate research and development strategy which would be valid for 
all of the countries and of the enterprises in time of economic crisis: the question is 
whether the governments and the business enterprises should choose a procyclical 
or a countercyclical path of investment strategy. In theory, countercyclical budget-
ing and macroeconomic policy would be desirable to bring under the control of 
booms and busts in the economy and to undertake countercyclical fi scal measures 
in the fi elds of innovation, research and development, especially, in time of eco-
nomic crisis in order to keep up and reallocate human and economic resources for 
the future development (Bradley et al. 2009; Baumol and Blinder, 2009, 345-349.) 
Therefore, it is not so diffi cult to give a defi nite answer to this question if we are 
aware of the fact that discounting the future economic and social development of 
a country or the long-term economic prospect of a corporation is not a particularly 
creative idea. To economize on the investment costs of producing new knowledge 
for the future is not only a shortsighted business and public policy, but also due 
mainly to the failure of reallocating limited resources to the most productive uses 
and of taking advantage of lower opportunity costs of diverting more resources 
from production to research and development activities in time of economic down-
turn, but it exhibits an unfair distribution of human and economic resources from 
the point of view of inter- as well as intra-generational equity. For the above-men-
tioned reasons, the Schumpeterian growth theory is all about the countercyclical in-
vestment strategy of the countries and the corporations in innovation, research and 
development; it provides the very foundation of dynamic economic system. Some 
current economic surveys conjecture an optimistic outlook concerning the behav-
ior of the most innovative, leading-edge enterprises; the majority of them rather 
endeavor to increase or at least sustain their research and development activities in 
order to strengthen their competitive advantages in the forthcoming upturn than to 
hibernate or take some defensive strategy through the recent downturn (Frey and 
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Callahan 2008; Leadbeater and Meadway 2008; Innobarometer 2009). In opposi-
tion to these optimistic views on the behavior of the large corporations, the recent 
quarterly reports of the publicly traded corporations in US stock markets signal a 
procyclical trend. The current survey of 2097 large publicly traded corporations 
shows that the corporate research and development expenditures are signifi cantly 
reduced in the fi rst quarters of 2009. The decline of corporate research and devel-
opment spending is especially apparent in semiconductor industry, information and 
communication technologies and services which are generally grouped into high 
and medium high research and development intensive sectors (OECD 2009, 22-
23.). The Innobarometer 2009 Analytical Report interviewed 5,034 innovative en-
terprises across Europe also confi rms these declining trends: the recent economic 
crisis forced more European enterprises (28.3 per cent) to reduce their research 
and development expenditures than to increase them (11.5 per cent); meanwhile 
the 50.7 per cent of the enterprises expected to maintain the total amount of their 
innovation expenditures (Innobarometer 2009 101-102.). The latest statistical fi g-
ures also show that the relative share of the research and development funds of 
the business enterprises in terms of the total research and development spending 
and the venture capital investment were stagnant and somewhat declining in most 
EU member states in 2009. While, it is quite obvious that the countercyclical be-
havior of the fi rms and the governments in the fi elds of innovation, research and 
development would be benefi cial due to its long-term positive impact on corporate 
performance as well as the economic and social development of the countries; it 
is particularly diffi cult to implement this countercyclical strategy in time of tight 
credit and budgetary constraints (Voigt and Castello 2009, 19-24.).
To sum up, the theoretical arguments for the long-term advantages of coun-
tercyclical investment strategy in innovation, research and development are sound 
and quite convincing. In time of economic crisis, as Philippe Aghion states, “…a 
natural prediction is that the lower the level of fi nancial development, that is, the 
tighter the credit constraints faced by fi rms, the more growth-enhancing such coun-
tercyclical policies should be” (Aghion 2006, 17.). However, the empirical evi-
dence attests that neither the majority of the EU member states, nor the European 
enterprises follow the Schumpeterian growth model in their research and develop-
ment investment strategy for the future development. The Schumpeterian model 
of strategic adaptation under recession appears to be the exception rather than the 
rule among the European business enterprises and the EU member states. The be-
havior of the majority of the EU member states as well as the European business 
enterprises is patently procyclical, that is to say, they usually invest more in time 
of economic upturn, and less in time of economic downturn in innovation, research 
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and development which will presumably widen or at most keep up the innovation 
gap between them and their most innovative global competitors if the latter choose 
countercyclical investment strategy. A recently published IMF study also demon-
strates that the procyclicality of government expenditure in the new EU member 
states, especially, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania and Latvia between 2003 and 2007 
reduced their ability and fi scal space for countercyclical fi scal policy to get out 
of the downturn (Rahman 2010). After all, the countercyclical behavior seems to 
be the privilege of the most innovative enterprises as well as the most innovative 
countries in order to create and ensure their position in new markets and generate 
competitive advantage for the forthcoming upturn. In the last decade, only the most 
innovative EU member states, Sweden, Finland and Denmark could produce con-
siderable amount of budgetary surplus and keep their public debt ratios quite low 
which provide fi nancial sources for maneuvering in time of economic depression.
Therefore, regarding the stalled public and private research and development 
expenditures of the majority of the EU-27 between 2000 and 2008, it is hard to 
fi gure out the countercyclical behaviors of the European business enterprises and 
the governments in order to spur economic recovery and accommodate in this way 
to the forthcoming upturn. In most countries and most European corporations, 
the public and private budgets seem to be kept too tight to realize any signifi cant 
change in innovation, research and development policy for the future development. 
Although a profound economic transformation toward knowledge-driven and high-
technology industries and structural reforms in different policy domains are even 
more compelling in time of recession. Up to now, the expanded roles of the govern-
ments of the EU member states have been rather manifested in short-term coun-
tercyclical economic measures to mitigate the direct and immediate consequences 
of the global economic crisis, particularly, in the banking sector and automotive 
industry than in long-term fi scal projections on behalf of the future growth and 
prosperity. The distribution of public spending in many EU member states has 
displayed long-term rigidity and the lack of willingness to bring about dynamic 
change in the composition of budget and macroeconomic policy in order to give 
an impulse to innovation, research and development before and after Lisbon. In 
spite of the recommendations of the European Commission, the governments in a 
few EU member states have already announced the intention of cutting down on 
the public research and development expenditures and especially higher education 
spending for the 2010, 2011 and the following budgetary years, therefore, it is not 
early to predict even on the basis of scattered data, uncertain political projects, and 
newspaper articles that the majority of the EU governments under the pressure of 
enormous budget defi cit, public and private debt burdens, and zero or negative 
Chapter 3.indd   78 2012.05.14.   8:09:44
79
economic growth are forced to follow procyclical investment strategy in this policy 
domain (Theil 2008; Kitching et al. 2009; Le Billon 2009; Schaeffer, 2009; Les 
dépenses de l’Etat, 2010; Solletty 2010). For sure, public and private innovation, 
research and development expenditures will not remain intact after the procyclical 
retrenchment measures of the governments of the EU member states. Procyclical 
innovation, research and development policy will result that convergence in terms 
of income per capita between the high and the low research and development inten-
sive EU member states, especially, the new EU member states, will be presumably 
impeded even after the economic recovery begins. The economic recovery will 
bring about further concentration of research and development activities across Eu-
rope and increase regional differences on behalf of the most innovative countries. 
In the long run, the lack of the adaptation of innovation-enhancing strategy, low re-
search and development intensity, and the recent cut down on the investment costs 
of innovation, research and development and higher education budget condemn 
the economy of these countries to a nonconvergence trap. The recent course of 
government actions raises doubts about the future growth potential of the new EU 
member states. Without the fundamental changes in the distribution of economic 
resources, economic structure, policy objectives, institutions and education system 
the new EU member states will not be able to reduce their distance to the global 
innovation frontier in the coming years (Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti 2006, 37-
74.; Aghion and Howitt 2006, 269-314.). 
The European Commission also outlines a particularized innovation strategy 
of the future for the governments of the EU member states as well as the European 
corporations. In A European Economic Recovery Plan (2008), the European Com-
mission opts for the reallocation of public and private research and development 
expenditures, above all, to the energy, automotive, construction, and manufactur-
ing sectors which are supposed to bring about a major structural transformation 
towards the low carbon or green economy in the near future. Phrasing the Schum-
peterian fear, the European Commission undertakes to chart the uncharted seas of 
technological possibilities for the future development (Schumpeter 1950, 118.). In 
the above-mentioned and other recent offi cial documents of the European Union, 
there are fewer talks about knowledge-based economy, and generally the social 
preconditions of the production, use, and distribution of knowledge in society; the 
notions of the low carbon economy or green economy seems to be a substitute 
for these former catchwords as if those would have fallen out of fashion. In this 
way, the dynamic transformation toward a green economy is rather technological 
than social process directed by committees and experts. Even though, making a 
breakthrough in greening the European economy mainly relies on the change of a 
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way of life on a scale which presumes the basic alteration of long-term social and 
economic objectives.1 However, the Lisbon Strategy does not imply this profound 
social alteration.
In this essay, I review the origin of the Barcelona target – the 3 per cent of pub-
lic and private expenditures on research and development in terms of GDP by 2010 
– and examine its feasibility, social and economic rationale aiming to mobilize the 
political and corporate actors to its fulfi llment. I also endeavor to measure, at least 
in retrospect, what would have been a proper percentage and annual increase of 
public and private research and development expenditures in terms of GDP in or-
der to bridge the gap between the EU member states and their most dynamic global 
political and economic partners as well as the European corporations and their 
global competitors by 2010. Finally, I would like to raise a broader philosophical 
question concerning the reasonableness of this voluntaristic political aspiration of 
the Lisbon Strategy in the fi elds of innovation, research and development, namely, 
surpassing the innovation frontiers of the most dynamic global political and eco-
nomic partners of the European Union, especially, the United States, Japan and 
South Korea by means of the Europeanization of the production, use, and dissemi-
nation of knowledge and information. 
Lisbon Strategy and the Origin of the 3 per cent Barcelona Target
Two years after Lisbon, the Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European 
Council of 15 and 16 March 2002 set an exact fi gure concerning public and private 
expenditures on research and development in terms of GDP for the governments 
of the EU member states as well as the European corporations. According to the 
Presidency Conclusions in Barcelona, “…in order to close the gap between the EU 
and its major competitors, there must be a signifi cant boost of the overall R&D and 
innovation effort in the Union, with a particular emphasis on frontier technologies. 
The European Council therefore […] agrees that overall spending on R&D and in-
novation in the Union should be increased with the aim of approaching 3% of GDP 
by 2010. Two-thirds of this new investment should come from the private sector” 
(European Council 2002, § 47.). All offi cial documents and communications, the 
National Reform Programs (earlier, National Action Plans) issued by the European 
Commission and the EU member states have considered this 3 per cent target as a 
1  As Lars Josefsson, the CEO of Vattenfall, put it: the change in the use of clean and renewable 
energy sources “…is not a question of money or technology. It requires a redesign of society.” 
Quoted by Mark Fischetti (Fischetti 2009).
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hard and fast rule in an old manner of centrally planned economy since 2002. 
Beyond the fact that the aim of attaining the 3 per cent of overall public and 
private research and development expenditures in terms of GDP by 2010 offers 
an appealing perspective for the European economic and social development, I 
could not fi nd any meticulous social and economic studies or policy and support 
papers among the offi cial documents which would have provided comprehensive 
macro- and micro-economic analyses, economic, political and social justifi cations 
to pinpoint the 3 per cent Barcelona target by 2010 in connection to the forecasted 
growth rate and the innovative potentials of the European economy, or the present 
and future challenges of the most dynamic global competitors. With the exception 
of few dissenting voices in the United Kingdom and Italy, the majority of the EU 
member states complied with the 3 per cent Barcelona target as the executable end 
of the Lisbon Strategy without argument (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
2005, 6.; HM Treasury 2006, 26.). For certain, policy and support papers, social 
and economic analyses dealing with the reasons of the decline in the innovation 
performance of the majority of the EU member states since the end of the 1980’s, 
the strengths and weaknesses of the European knowledge production, the inno-
vative potentials of the high, medium and low research intensive sectors of the 
European economy, the geographical dispersion, research outputs and the nodality 
of the European private and public research centers and universities etc. were not 
listed among the attached documents submitted prior to the Lisbon or the Barce-
lona European Council.2 
Six months later of the Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European 
Council of 15 and 16 March 2002 the European Commission issued a document 
– More Research for Europe: Towards 3% of GDP – which endeavored to give 
a general overview of the European innovation landscape as well as economic, 
social, and political justifi cations for the importance of effective and integrated 
research and innovation policy in Europe. However, this document and its attach-
ment rather emphasized the desirability of the 3 per cent Barcelona target than ana-
2  On the basis of Article 4.3 § 2 of Regulation Nr 1049/2001, the DG Research-R6 Unit of the 
European Commission denied my request to access to the documents which might (or not) have 
established the economic and social feasibility of the 3 per cent Barcelona target quoting in its letter 
written on 13 November 2009 that the disclosure of these documents “would seriously undermine 
the institution’s decision-making process”. Besides the fact that its refusal is unsubstantiated since 
the decision making procedure in this particular case terminated more than seven years ago, need-
less to emphasize, my essay does not intend to do that. In its letter written on 4 December 2009, the 
DG Research-R6 Unit of the European Commission further indicated that no public interest exists 
to disclose the requested documents. On account of the documents which are available to the public 
I have come to the conclusion that the political statement concerning the 3 per cent target of GDP in 
Barcelona was in lack of a careful and comprehensive economic consideration in 2002. 
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lyzed and substantiated its feasibility. While, the argumentation of this document 
derives from the main thesis of endogenous growth theory which lays emphasis 
on knowledge production, knowledge spillovers, quality-improving innovations, 
human capital formation and growth-enhancing institutions as the prime movers 
of economic development, no attempt was made to calculate the actual magnitude 
of social and economic defi cits, regional disunity, and sectoral under-, or overin-
vestment in these domains. Briefl y, differences among the EU member states, for 
instance, the size of low, medium and high research and development intensive 
sectors in the economy, the availability of human resources, actual research and 
development intensity etc., which would have required quite various research and 
development policies, were left out of consideration. The EU Scientifi c and Techni-
cal Research Committee (CREST) greeted the Commission Communication as the 
necessary step forward in order to tackle the widening innovation gap between the 
European Union and its global competitors in its 2003 Opinion; but oddly enough, 
its involvement in the preparation of the Barcelona decision is not documented.
It is quite obvious that high research and development expenditures generally 
have the long-term positive effects on the economy and society but the authors of 
More Research for Europe: Towards 3% of GDP (2002) failed to give details of 
the key problem of the European economy, namely, how to handle the long-term 
stagnant private research and development expenditures which have hampered the 
European corporations as well as the EU member states to keep pace with the de-
velopment of their global competitors in most of the business sectors, and many 
research and development areas for a long time. Before everything else, the corpo-
rate underinvestment in innovation, research and development has been a general 
and lasting phenomenon in most of the business sectors of the European economy 
at least since the end of the 1980’s which has caused about € 55-93 billion yearly 
private investment gap between the European and the American corporations in 
this decade.3 What is more, the private investment gap between the European and 
the American corporations has been widening since 2002. (So, has the public in-
vestment gap between the European Union and the United States since 2000.) Al-
though, public research and development expenditures in most of the EU member 
states also lag behind of the most innovative global competitors’, the gap is not 
so wide as  in the case of private research and development investments. In short, 
3  The total research and development investment gap between the European Union and the 
United States has been widened from € 73.4 billion to € 98.5 billion between 2000 and 2008. The 
European Commission reported in its communication in 4 June 2003 that “[t]he gap in research 
investment between the European Union and the United States is already in excess of € 120 billion 
per year…”. (European Commission 2003, 4-5.) Nevertheless, the actual fi gures of the Eurostat and 
the OECD.Stat do not support the European Commission’s rude estimation.
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the improvement of public research and development spending could have been 
achieved within a reasonable time by means of shifting focus on budgetary priori-
ties to provide funds for the production of new knowledge advocated unanimously 
by the European Council and the EU member states. In spite of this common ob-
jective, public research and development spending has also been stagnant or even 
declining, especially, in the largest EU member states, like in Germany, France, 
Italy and the United Kingdom since 2000. 
In this respect, the authors of the More Research for Europe: Towards 3% 
of GDP (2002) mainly centered on the urgent need of the improvement of the 
community-wide legal and institutional framework as well as the changes in the 
priorities of public policy which is supposed to stimulate the European corpora-
tions to increase their research and development intensity. This may be a promising 
proposal; however, the fragmented institutional and legal structure in Europe does 
not seem to prevent the most innovative European corporations to keep pace with 
or even to surpass their global competitors. Besides the institutional, systemic and 
market failures – whether the lack of markets and market incentives prevent many 
business enterprises to innovate – were not scrutinized in this document which 
may justify the increase of public fi nancial incentives and direct fi scal measures on 
behalf of the European corporations. 
Due to the lack of the precise enumeration of the preparatory materials for 
political decision making in this policy domain, I am compelled to suppose that the 
drafters of the Presidency Conclusions of the Barcelona European Council simply 
defi ned the 3 per cent target by 2010 in the context of the research and development 
expenditures of the most innovative countries worldwide, especially, the United 
States, Japan and South Korea.4
In any case, the 3 per cent of public and private research and development ex-
penditures in terms of GDP would not be suffi cient to declare in 2010 that the Eu-
ropean Union is the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world unless the research and development performance of the most innovative 
global competitors remains stagnant or even decline in the coming years. The Lis-
bon strategy simply disregarded the fact that there are quite a few countries among 
the global competitors like South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore which were close 
to approach the 3 per cent research and development expenditures during the fi rst 
decade of 2000, and they have had good opportunity to reach and surpass it by 
4  Because the feasibility of the 3 per cent Barcelona target was not scrutinized before its an-
nouncement, João Caraça assumed that this 3 per cent Barcelona target is a part of the old European 
project originating from the famous prospective report of the French Commissariat général du Plan 
– Réfl exions pour 1985 – published in 1964 (Groupe 1985, 1964, 20., 121.; Caraça 2007) .
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2010. For instance, South Korea’s gross domestic expenditure on research and de-
velopment has already exceeded 3 per cent of GDP in 2006, and it aims at increas-
ing its public and private research and development expenditures to 5 per cent of 
GDP by 2012. Israel also plans to maintain 5 per cent research and development 
expenditure in terms of GDP for the coming years (Israel 2028, 132.). In addition, 
China more than doubled its research and development expenditures from 0.6 per 
cent to 1.44 per cent of GDP from 1995 to 2007. The Chinese government intends 
to increase research and development intensity to 2 per cent of GDP by 2010 which 
means that China will catch up with and outmatch the EU-27 as well as the EU-15 
by the end of the present decade if the governments of the EU member states and 
the European business community fail to take a more knowledge-driven growth 
path in the near future (OECD 2008, 111.; Minder 2005; Laitner 2007). Be that as it 
may, long-term economic forecasts and analyses have not indicated the probability 
of the long-term stagnant or even declining research and development performance 
of the global competitors of the European Union, yet. Therefore, it would have 
been more pragmatic to announce that the European Union makes all efforts to 
catch up with the research and development intensity of the most innovative coun-
tries, like Israel, Sweden, Finland, Japan, South Korea, Iceland, the United States, 
Switzerland, Taiwan and Singapore. For sure, if the recent trends continue the Eu-
ropean Union loses its position to China and the most dynamic Asian competitors 
in the global innovation ranking by the beginning of this decade. 
Nevertheless, the Lisbon and Barcelona Presidency Conclusions in 2000 and 
2002 accentuated somewhat different aims for the future prospects of innovation, 
research and development of the European Union. While, the Lisbon Presidency 
Conclusions declared that the objective of the European Union is to surpass the 
innovation frontiers of its global competitors and to obtain the leading position 
in the global ranking of innovation performance; two years later the Barcelona 
Presidency Conclusions merely communicated that the EU member states intend 
to close the gap between the European Union and its most innovative global com-
petitors. Needless to say, the latter political aspiration certainly appears to be less 
ambitious and less unrealistic than the former. Although making nuanced distinc-
tions between the two political statements of the Lisbon and Barcelona Presidency 
Conclusions sounds quite a bit pedantic regarding  the decennial verbalism and 
inaction of fulfi lling the primary objectives of the Lisbon Strategy, that is to say, 
“to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world”. As a matter of fact, neither the gap will close between the European Union 
and the most innovative countries, nor the European Union manage to obtain the 
leading position in the global ranking of innovation performance by 2010. Besides 
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the most innovative EU member states like Sweden and Finland which managed 
to protect and advance their distinguished positions in the global innovation rank-
ing, the European Union could not move closer to the global innovation frontier 
since 2000. The impressive performance of the most innovative small EU member 
states does little to compensate for the weak commitment of the largest EU mem-
ber states and the long-term underinvestment in research and development across 
the European Union as a whole. In the last ten years, the innovation gap between 
the European Union and the most innovative global competitors has been widened, 
indeed.
A year after the Barcelona European Council, the European Commission 
Directorate-General for Research published the Third European Report on Sci-
ence & Technology Indicators (2003), in which the rapporteurs gave a com-
prehensive survey of the European innovation landscape and forecasted po-
tential outcomes for the evolution of knowledge-driven economic growth of 
the European Union, the United States and Japan for the period of 2000-2010. 
While, the rapporteurs affi rmed the outstanding importance of the objectives 
of the Lisbon and Barcelona Presidency Conclusions concerning the creation 
of a knowledge-based economy and society, they also casted serious doubt on 
the achievability of the 3 per cent Barcelona target by 2010  mainly due to the 
political, economic, institutional and organizational inertia of most of the EU 
member states and of the European business enterprises in the implementation 
of the Lisbon Strategy. Given that most of the EU member states and the Eu-
ropean business enterprises followed procyclical investment strategy after the 
bursting of the internet bubble, the public as well as the private research and 
development expenditures have declined since 2000 in many key sectors of 
the European economy. According to the rapporteurs’ prediction, if substantial 
efforts and profound reorientation of public and private research and develop-
ment policy do not take place in the following years, the research and develop-
ment expenditure of the European Union is expected to be at most 2.2-2.3 per 
cent in terms of GDP in 2010. Even in the case of the best possible outcome 
outlined by the rapporteurs, the innovation gap between the European Union, 
the United States and Japan was anticipated to be widening by 2010. It turned 
out later that this prediction for the future research and development intensity 
of the EU member states and the European business enterprises appears to be 
rather optimistic, since the 2010 fi gure is 2 per cent in terms of GDP (European 
Commission 2003a, 45-47., 189., 192.). However, this modest increase is quite 
deceptive with regard to the fact that most EU member states struggled for 
keeping up the level of their 2007 and 2008 GDP in 2010. 
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Besides the long-term stalled trend of public and private research and develop-
ment intensity, the rapporteurs pointed out one of the most serious consequences 
which makes the fulfi llment of the main objectives of the Lisbon Strategy by 2010 
somewhat unrealistic. Namely, an additional 835 000 researchers – about 80 000 
young qualifi ed researchers per year – in the fi elds of mathematics, science and 
technology are badly needed for higher education, government and, especially, 
business sectors in Europe by 2010 in order to catch up with the number of re-
searchers in the United States and Japan. However, the European Universities and 
Research Centers produce not more than 40 000 doctoral graduates per year in 
these fi elds (Eurostat Statistical Yearbook 2008, 68.).5 Perhaps one of the most per-
plexing phenomena of the European economic and social development concerning 
the aspiration of creating knowledge-based economy and society is that while, the 
number of graduate and doctoral students in the fi elds of mathematics, science and 
technology is almost twice as much than in the United States and Japan, far less 
young qualifi ed researchers are engaged in innovation, research and development 
activities in Europe, particularly, in the business sector. In brief, the most qualifi ed 
human resources as the most important asset of knowledge-based economy and 
society are vastly underutilized in most of the EU member states. The majority of 
the EU member states will not be able to increase the number of the most quali-
fi ed human resources in research sector under the recent circumstance of stringent 
public and private spending, due to the fact that the largest part of the research and 
development expenditures consists of the wage costs paid for the researchers and 
the research personnel (Curtis 2009; Shepherd 2010, 4.; Jha and Sample 2010). For 
this reason, lower research and development expenditure is corollary of the lower 
rate of employment of most qualifi ed human resources in research activities per 1 
000 labor force and of lower capital intensity of the research and development de-
partments of the European enterprises, universities and research centers in compar-
ison with the United States and Japan. The modest demand for the young qualifi ed 
researchers and the lack of competitive remuneration compel the signifi cant part 
of the graduates and the doctoral students in mathematics, science and technology 
to fi nd employment rather in public administration, banking, fi nance and insurance 
sector instead of contributing to the adoption of new innovation and frontier tech-
nologies, or to seek employment in research sector and higher education abroad. 
As the rapporteurs concluded, “Europe has for many years been, and continues to 
be, a wellspring from which countries such as the US, and to a lesser extent Aus-
5  Jean-Paul Betbèze estimated that 300 000 – 500 000 additional researchers are needed in Eu-
rope to achieve the 3 per cent Barcelona target (Betbèze 2005, 193.). Jerry Sheehan and Andrew 
Wyckoff calculated that the additional number of researchers needed would be almost 600 000 by 
2010 (Sheehan and Wyckoff  2003, 27-28.)
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tralia and Canada, have been drawing personnel with S&T skills” (OECD 2005, 
168-170., 209-210; European Commission 2003a, 222.).
The European Commission in the Investing in Research: An Action Plan for 
Europe (2003) proclaimed that the EU member states and the candidate countries, 
the representatives of the large European corporations, small and medium-size en-
terprises and other stakeholders participated in the extensive political consultations 
on the objectives of the Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon and Barcelona Eu-
ropean Council unanimously supported the three per cent target by 2010. In spite 
of the political announcement of the European Commission, this overwhelming 
political support of the different stakeholders did not turn into action which would 
have required sustained efforts in the subsequent years. The EU member states and 
the European business enterprises should have at least tripled the annual growth 
rate of their research and development expenditures to meet the Barcelona tar-
get. The statistical fi gures relating to science, technology and innovation indicators 
were rather dispiriting: the public as well as the private research and development 
expenditures have declined further in the European Union between 2000 and 2006. 
The politicians of the European Union and the majority of the EU member states 
always articulate their high devotion to the Lisbon Strategy while they act contrary 
to its basic objectives in the domains of innovation, research and development. 
Surprisingly, the obvious policy blunder and the unwillingness of the majority of 
the governments of the EU member states and the European business enterprise 
to rearrange their budgetary priorities and allocate more resources in innovation, 
research and development activities did not seem to undermine the confi dence of 
the European Commission and other political institutions in the achievability of the 
objectives of the Lisbon Strategy. 
In order to substantiate the attainability of the 3 per cent Barcelona target, the 
European Commission quoted the main fi ndings of the macroeconomic study made 
by the Laboratoire ERASME concerning the impacts of the knowledge-based de-
velopment on the European economy and society. However, the study of the Labo-
ratoire ERASME does not deal with the innovative potentials of the European 
economy and the individual countries relied on the profound analysis of the eco-
nomic and social reality, the causes and consequences of the decennial stagnant 
trend of research and development intensities, the regional differences among the 
EU member states and so forth; it mainly conjectures the long-term macroeco-
nomic results of the fulfi llment of the 3 per cent Barcelona target and describes its 
prospective consequences in terms of the main economic indicators like the growth 
of GDP, total factor productivity, employment, consumption, external and internal 
trades, budget balance etc. by 2030. The study of the Laboratoire ERASME simply 
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presupposes without further argument that all of the EU member states live up to 
the 3 per cent Barcelona target by 2010 and takes it as a starting point of quantify-
ing the long-term economic and social returns to the higher research and develop-
ment intensities of the EU member states (Brécard et al. 2006, 910-924.). In this 
way, the study of the Laboratoire ERASME describes the ex post world based on 
the above-mentioned presupposition in order to provide justifi cation for the Lisbon 
Strategy but it does not ponder on what kinds of systematic, structural and regula-
tory changes must be done on industry, national and community levels to meet its 
objectives. 
This presupposition led the authors to draw many untenable and doubtful con-
clusions for the future of the European economy due to the fact that those were 
not inferred from the innovative potentials, the use and availability of qualifi ed 
human resources, the industrial structures, the actual research and development ex-
penditures and concrete policy measures of the individual member states but from 
political declarations. It is a particularly perplexing assumption of the authors in 
regard to the recent fi nancial crisis, enormous budget defi cit, unsustainable fi scal 
expansions, public and private indebtedness, and decennial inaction in the domain 
of innovation, research and development that they expect the Southern European 
member states to confer the greatest benefi t of the fulfi llment of the Lisbon Strat-
egy in terms of growth, employment, total factor productivity, budget balance and 
so forth. The authors indicated that because the less research and development in-
tensive countries are required to boost their research and development intensities to 
the greatest degree for the purpose of meeting the 3 per cent Barcelona target, their 
efforts will bring about the deepest economic transformation towards the knowl-
edge-based economy. This assumption, to wit, the low research and development 
intensive or hitherto laggard countries are in more advantageous position than the 
innovative countries due to the faster catch-up process and the high rates of con-
vergence is not supported in the literature of endogenous growth theory. To meet 
the presupposition of the authors, these low research and development intensive 
countries would have had to triple or quadruple their private and public research 
and development investments within a short period of time. As a matter of fact, 
none of the governments of the Southern European member states has declared in 
their National Reform Programs that they will match their own national research 
and development policy to the 3 per cent Barcelona target by 2010. Therefore, the 
authors’ assumption concerning the fast catch-up of the laggard countries and the 
proximate and signifi cant positive impact of the Lisbon Strategy on the less research 
and development intensive countries are vastly hypothetical and misleading. Only 
Portugal and Spain could move a bit closer to the global innovation frontier by in-
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creasing its research and development intensity from 0.76 to 1.51 and from 0.91 
to 1.35 per cent of GDP between 2000 and 2008 respectively, even though these 
fi gures lag behind the offi cial targets announced in their own National Reform 
Programs and their annual growth rates of research and development investments, 
especially in Spain, are not particularly impressive. Although, Spain planned to 
double its research and development investment to 2 per cent of GDP by 2010, 
the authors of the Spanish National Reform Program (2005) assume on the basis 
of the modest progress of the research and development intensity in 2000-2003 
that if the current growth rate were maintained, it would take another 20 years 
for Spain to reach that 2 per cent (Spanish Prime Minister’s Economic Offi ce 
2005, 36., 47.). In addition, the study of the Laboratoire ERASME hazarded a 
guess that the greatest benefactor of the Lisbon Strategy among the EU member 
states is Greece. At the same time, the study of the Laboratoire ERASME fore-
casted that the high research and development intensive countries, like Finland 
and Sweden, will benefi t rather modestly from the 3 per cent Barcelona target in 
long term, assuming that they will maintain their research and development in-
tensity at the current level after 2010 as well. However, it is not a very plausible 
presupposition. On the one hand, the high and increasing share of the knowledge-
intensive industries of Finland and Sweden in the total industrial output and their 
frontier positions on the global economy depends on whether they will keep up 
to accelerate their research and development intensities in the future, or not. On 
the other hand, the benchmark for the long-term innovation policy of Finland and 
Sweden is not the 3 per cent Barcelona target but the dynamics and trajectory of 
their most innovative global competitors. 
The authors neglected the very fact that the industrial structures account for 
the major differences of research and development intensities among the EU mem-
ber states. In countries where the signifi cant part of the economic output comes 
from the high and medium high technology sectors, like, pharmaceuticals, com-
puting and offi ce equipment, communications equipment, scientifi c instruments, 
aerospace manufacturing and so forth, research and development intensities are 
certainly higher than in countries where the low and medium technology sectors 
like food producers, general retailers, tobacco, mobile and fi xed line telecommu-
nications, services, metals, banks, tourism, construction and materials, food and 
drug retailers, beverages, industrial transportation, mining, electricity and so forth 
produce the largest part of the economic output. In the latter countries, research 
and development intensity will remain fairly low if they do not lessen the relative 
size of the low and medium research and development intensive sectors in the 
economy. 
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The Barcelona Presidency Conclusions gave little attention to the signifi cant 
differences of the research and development intensities, industrial structures, pref-
erences and capabilities among the EU member states. Its objectives applied to all 
EU member states regardless of their distinct starting points, future prospects and 
time span for convergence towards the global innovation frontiers. The research 
and development intensity of the EU member states varied to a signifi cant degree, 
it was dispersed from the Swedish 4.27 per cent to the Greek 0.65 per cent in terms 
of GDP in 2002. As the Lisbon Strategy Evaluation Document (2010) has rightly 
pointed out eight years later: “EU-level targets were too numerous and did not 
suffi ciently refl ect differences in starting positions between the Member States, 
particularly following enlargement. The absence of clearly agreed commitments 
also exacerbated problems with ownership. For instance, the performance of some 
Member States already exceeded the target, whereas for others targets were set at 
such level that meeting them within the available time-frames appeared unrealis-
tic” (European Commission 2010, 6.). 
The innovation, research and development policy of the Lisbon Strategy and the 
3 per cent Barcelona target utterly demonstrate this undifferentiated, one-size-fi ts-
all approach. Innovation, research and development strategy is mainly discussed 
as if the production, use and exchange of knowledge have only one, a European 
centered geographical dimension, and the performance of the European Union in 
this fi eld is equal to the straightforward aggregate of the domestic performances 
of the EU member states which are supposed to converge towards the level of the 
most innovative countries by 2010. Income inequality, the stock of knowledge, the 
quality of government, institutional framework, innovation policy and infrastruc-
ture, the composition of human capital, the geography, the networks and nodalities 
of knowledge production, and the actual sector mix of the national economies were 
disregarded. The long-term convergence among the EU member states was thought 
to be a matter of course; sooner or later the low research and development intensive 
EU member states will be able to catch up with the most innovative countries and 
will get onto the global innovation frontier.
Verbalism, Inaction, and Governance Failure
Because the planning and fi nancing of research and development policy main-
ly falls into the competence of national governments, and prerogatives are not as-
signed to the political institutions of the European Union in this policy domain, 
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the European Council has to leave the integration of the main objectives of the 
Lisbon Strategy into the budgeting processes, execution, and management of their 
national research and development programs to the EU member states. Due to the 
established system of the allocation of responsibilities between the political bodies 
and institutions of the European Union and the national governments, the European 
Union in the policy making process of research and development does not exercise 
legislative or executive power; it merely plays a broad visionary role. Furthermore, 
the European Commission and other political institutions of the European Union 
are in lack of capacity, fi nancial means, and solid economic foundation to make 
detailed and applicable recommendations. In this way, the Lisbon Strategy and 
its follow-up documents did not go into details, did not refl ect on geographical 
divergences, and did not render appropriate schedules and priorities for each indi-
vidual EU member state in accordance with the different stages of their economic 
development and did not provide special funds and programs for the less research 
and development intensive countries, especially, for the new EU member states. 
The European Union distributes the limited amounts of EU research and develop-
ment funds on the merit-based assessment of the individual projects in accordance 
with its own, instituted thematic priorities, and does not apply, for instance, the 
Rawlsian maximin, leximin, or other kind of rule utilitarian principle in order to 
redistribute some part of its community research and development budget fi rst on 
behalf of the least research and development intensive countries, or regions (Euro-
pean Commission 2007). That is true that community block grants to universities 
and other public and private research centers would not provide a very effi cient and 
cost-effective way of fi nancing and improving research and development intensity 
in the European Union compared with selecting and fi nancing regionally concen-
trated knowledge clusters on the merit-based assessment, but if the original aim of 
the Lisbon Strategy is to raise the less innovative EU member states and to level 
up to the higher research and development intensity across Europe, the application 
of some kind of rule or negative utilitarian principle in case of the distribution and 
use of resources is inevitable. An integrated strategy of the European Union for in-
novation, research and development activities which follows either rule utilitarian, 
ordinal utilitarian, merit based, or multiple principle concerning the distribution 
and use of research and development resources is still being awaited. Therefore, 
each country could mostly use its own human and economic resources and follow 
its own innovation, research and development strategy and space of development 
which could fi t to its industrial structure as well as its political agenda. As the 
Treaty of the European Union (2008) declares, “The Conference agrees that the 
Union’s action in the area of research and technological development will pay due 
respect to the fundamental orientations and choices of the research policies of the 
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Member States” (European Council 2008, decl. 34. on art. 197.). Briefl y, while the 
European Union continuously endeavors to expand its activity into agenda setting, 
decision making processes, control and enforcement in more and more policy do-
mains, there are not shared political responsibilities and competencies between the 
political bodies of the European Union and the EU member states in innovation, 
research and development policy (Alesina and Perotti 2004, 14-15.; Búrca 2003, 
814.). 
Under the recent constitutional construct, the political responsibility and com-
petency of setting, fi nancing, managing and supervising research and development 
policy resides almost solely in the national governments, even if the production, 
use, and exchange of knowledge, its spillover effects, positive and negative exter-
nalities make impact far beyond their territorial sovereignty and barely fi t the limits 
of nation-state. For this reason, the creation of the European Research Area (ERA) 
was addressed to take the pro-active steps in the fi eld of innovation, research and 
development in order to overcome the “fragmentation, isolation and compartmen-
talisation of national research efforts and systems and the disparity of regulatory 
and administrative systems” in June 2000, however, this initiative could not prop 
up the fall of the European position in the global innovation ranking in the fol-
lowing years due partly to the very limited – about 0.03-0.05 per cent – fi nancial 
contribution to the total research and development expenditure of the EU member 
states (European Commission 2000, 4-7.).
Instead of sharing political responsibilities, dividing competencies, or confer-
ring the legislative and executive power on the supranational institutions of the 
European Union, which would have been worrisome for a democratic society, and 
constitutionally and politically unfeasible due to the lack of legal basis and popular 
support for the interference of the political institutions of the European Union in in-
ternal affairs, and the economic, social and cultural differences of the EU member 
states, a new form of governance emerged for coordinating and implementing com-
mon policy objectives and processes in innovation, research and development, and 
other important social, economic, and environmental domains where legislative 
and executive actions on community level cannot be initiated (European Council 
2000, §§ 5., 37.; European Commission 2001, 2003). After establishing positive 
constitutional limits to the intervention of the political institutions of the European 
Union in the fi elds of innovation, research and development, the so-called open 
method of coordination was introduced for the purpose of setting up community 
guidelines and timetables for national policies, developing performance indicators 
and benchmarks, monitoring and peer-reviewing national processes and promoting 
best practices. The open method of coordination has been operated under the su-
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pervision of the EU Scientifi c and Technical Research Committee (CREST) since 
2003 although the actual infl uence of the CREST “as an operational interface to 
defi ne and oversee the implementation of the open method of coordination in re-
spect of the 3 % objective” on policy coordination and implementation is not really 
recognizable in the offi cial documents (European Council 2003). 
In the academic literature, the open method of coordination as the new form 
of governance received favorable assessment at the outset (Scott and Trubek 2002, 
1-18.; Armstrong 2005; Kröger 2009). It was supposed to lead to the substantive, 
more democratic reorientation of political agenda setting, decision making pro-
cesses, and the common goal’s implementation of the European Union, and to 
concert genuine collective action based on mutual responsiveness, commitment 
to the joint activity and mutual support among the EU member states and their 
constituencies.6 Besides, a few authors credited it with the emergence of the multi 
level governance and the materialization of authentic democratic ideal – refl ex-
ive deliberative polyarchy – which provides forum for public deliberation among 
the various stakeholders to be affected by the decisions aiming at free and rea-
soned agreement upon the common goods and interests in a quite diverse political 
community (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002, 291.; Cohen and Sabel 1997, 317.). By 
contrast to these favorable views, few authors discussed critically and evaluated 
the open method of coordination without constitutional foundation, binding rules 
and sanctions as the second best solution which was introduced to overcome the 
constitutional stalemate of the collective action of the EU member states in many 
important policy fi elds, like economic policy, social policy, employment, public 
health, research and development, and so forth. In spite of the predominantly fa-
vorable evaluations in the academic literature, the open method of coordination 
could foster neither dynamism, nor convergence, nor genuine deliberative process-
es in the fulfi llment of knowledge-based economy and society project since 2000. 
Its deployment has not resulted better, more effi cient, more democratic, and more 
coordinated decision making in the fi elds of innovation, research and development 
policy among the EU member states; it has not made any visible impact on revers-
ing the stagnant and declining trends of the last decades, yet. Because the new 
constitutional treaty of the European Union does not refer to the open method of 
coordination by name, its legal status as a new form of governance has remained 
vague and unresolved. Although, effi cient legal and institutional setting is the es-
sential instrument of conducting common policy objectives, it must be admitted 
that the failure of the fulfi llment of the 3 per cent Barcelona target can be attributed 
to the vagueness and internal contradictions of the Lisbon Strategy as well as po-
6  I use Michael Bratman’s notions to describe the preconditions of collective action (Brat-
man1999, 94-108.).  
Chapter 3.indd   95 2012.05.14.   8:09:45
96
litical inertia and collective action problems rather than the contingent legal status 
of the open method of coordination as such. 
After realizing the fi ve-year inaction of the majority of the EU member states 
in the mid-term review of the Lisbon Strategy, the Presidency Conclusions of the 
Brussels European Council of 22 and 23 March 2005 endeavored to reinforce the 
Lisbon Strategy by putting a stronger emphasis on growth and employment, and 
communicated the importance of reallocation of public and private resources on 
behalf of innovation, research and development. The Presidency Conclusions of 
the Brussels European Council consented to the predictions of endogenous growth 
theory which regards knowledge, innovation, human capital formation, proper le-
gal and institutional arrangements as the primary sources of long-term economic 
growth. Briefl y, high public and private investment in innovation, research and de-
velopment with large knowledge spillovers gear up for a high and steady economic 
growth rate of the European economy.
The Presidency Conclusions did not offer any explanation about what kind of 
market, institutional and political failures deprived the majority of the EU member 
states of aligning national policies with common research and development policy 
goals if the basic tenets of endogenous growth theory are so obvious and benefi cial, 
and if the accord of the EU member states in the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy is 
unanimous. While, the EU member states in the offi cial documents speak with one 
voice in matters of innovation, research and development policy – like “[k]nowl-
edge and innovation are the beating heart of European growth,” “[i]n advanced 
economies such as the EU, knowledge, meaning R&D, innovation and education, is 
a key driver of productivity growth,” “[i]nvesting in the knowledge should increase 
the capacity of the EU to innovate and to produce and use new technologies,” and 
so forth –, the majority of them keep acting in quite contradictory manner in the 
following years, as well (European Commission 2005, 4., 21., 30.). As the long-
term rigidity of the allocation of budgetary resources demonstrate, the majority of 
the EU member states does not accentuate innovation, research and development 
as the most important political and economic priority for the future economic and 
social development and also resist to harmonize their national policies with the 
Lisbon Strategy by way of the open method of coordination even if it appears to 
be a quite fl exible and suitable instrument to take each country’s economic situa-
tion, particular political and social interests into consideration and to facilitate the 
resolution of collective action problems among the EU member states. Mainly due 
to the ambivalent political commitment of the majority of the EU member states to 
the Lisbon Strategy, the open method of coordination could not become an effec-
tive and important instrument for encouraging the common strategic actions of the 
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EU member states and for setting the national public as well as private innovation, 
research and development policies in an integrated supra-national framework of 
the production, use, and exchange of knowledge (de la Porte 2002, 38., 39.; Búrca 
2003, 814., 820.; Bruno, Jacquot and Mandin 2006, 519-536.).
In spite of the substantial gap between the political aspiration and actual 
achievement, the political communications and documents issued by the European 
Commission and the European Council regularly have recourse to the Lisbon Strat-
egy as the blueprint of future policy and economic actions. Surprisingly, the Lisbon 
Strategy as a brand name of the political ineffectiveness further serves as a panacea 
for economic recovery in time of economic crisis and deep recession (European 
Commission 2008; European Commission 2010a).
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